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CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO
Theories and Practices of N eocorporatism
Wolfgang Streeck and Lane Kenworthy
The modern territorial state and the capi-
talist market economy superseded a political- -
economic order that consisted of a plethora
of corporate communities endowed with tradi-
tional rights and obligations, such as churches,
estates, cities, and guilds. Organized collectiv-
ities of all sorts, more or less closely related to
the economic division oflabar, regulated coop-
eration and competition among their members
and negotiated their relations with each other.
While themselves changing under the impact
of modernization, they often resisted the rise of
territorial bureaucratic rule and the spread of
market relations, sometimes well into the twen-
tieth century. But ultimately they proved un-
able to prevent the victory of the state form of
political organization and of the self-regulating
market as the dominant site of economic ex-
change. Modern liberalism, both political and
economic, in turn aimed at abolishing all forms
of intermediary organization that intervene be-
tween the individual and the state or the mar-
ket. In the end, however, it failed to eliminate
collectivism and had to accommodate itself to
both political faction and economic coopera-
tion.
Twenty-first-century political communities
are all organized by territorial nation-states. But
these had to learn to incorporate organized
collectivities and elements of a collective-asso-
ciative order in their different configurations
of bureaucratic hierarchy and free markets.
Variation among modern types of government,
between the utopian extremes of anarcho-
syndicalism and Rousseauian radical liberalism,
rotates around the relationship between terri-
torial and associative rule (Table 22.1). In the
Standestaat (state of estates) conceived in the
constitutional debates of nineteenth-century
Germany as a conservative alternative to liberal
democracy, territorial rule is exercised by dele-
gates of corporate groups, which are the princi-
pal constituents of the state. Later, in the twen-
tieth century, dictatorial state rule often used
state-instituted corporate bodies as transmission
belts of a governing party; this is what Schmit-
ter (1974) referred to as "state corporatism." In
European postwar democracies, by comparison,
territorial rule, which now took place through
parliamentary representation, shared the public
space with social groups organized on a more
voluntary basis and entitled to various forms
of collective participation and self-government,
provided they recognized the primacy of par-
liamentary democracy. This, in essence, is what
the literature is called in "neocorporatism" or
"liberal corporatism" (Schmitter, 1974; Lehm-
bruch, 1977). Finally, in more strictly liberal po-
litical systems, organized groups are tolerated
by the constitutional order on condition that
they limit themselves to lobbying the parliament
and refrain from claiming rights, however cir-
cumscribed, to authoritative decision making.
As a type of governance, this configuration of
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Table 22. I. Type if Government as a Result of Interaction Between 'Territorial State and
Associative Order























illegal any intermediary organization that repre-
sented subsections of the citizenry and thereby
interfered with its direct relationship with the
state.
In the spirit of thinkers such as Rousseau
(1964) and Madison (1973), nineteenth-century
liberalism remained suspicious of collective or-
ganization below the nation-state, holding on
to an atomistic image of political life in which
autonomous individuals were the only legiti-
mate constituents of the political order. Sub-
national collectivism of all sorts, including re-
ligious organization, was suspected of diverting
loyalty £rom the national state and was seen as a
threat to both political unity and individual lib-
erty. Similarly in the emerging capitalist market
economy, collective organization and coopera-
tion were perceived as conspiracy against free
competition. Not surprisingly, the political and
economic strands ofliberal anticollectivism eas-
ily blended into each other.
When faced with political or economic or-
ganization among its citizenry, the liberal state
felt called upon to suppress factionalism or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade. However, state inter-
vention in the name of political unity, individual
freedom and economic liberty, to safeguard the
proper individualism of the republic and of the
marketplace, may have paradoxical implications.
A political doctrine that relies on a strong state
to make society fit its premises borders on to-
talitarianism. In societies in which collectivism
and factionalism are deeply rooted, enforce-
ment by a strong state of a liberal political and
territorial state and associative order is here re-
ferred to as "pluralism" (Schmitter, 1974).I
Our discussion is divided into five sections.
The first describes the origins of neocorpo-
ratism and its conceptualization in political
thought, and the second does the same for the
early post-World War II period. The third sec-
tion addresses the distinction between corpo-
ratism and pluralism and then discusses corpo-
ratist organizational structure, concertation, and
private-interest government. Section 4 reviews
theory and research on the impact of corpo-
ratism on economic performance. In the fifth
section we address current tendencies that un-
dermine democratic corporatism.
CORPORATISM AND THE POLITICAL
CONSTITUTION OF MODERN SOCIETY
In the French Revolution, modern politics be-
gan as a revolt against a political order that rec-
ognized people, not as individuals, but only as
members of established social groups. The revo-
lution abolished the estates and postulated a di-
rect, unmediated relationship between citizens
and a state conceived as a republic of individuals.
A law passed by the Assembly in 179 I - the Loi
Ie Chapelier, named after its author - declared
J For a differing use of "pluralism" that encompasses
corporatism and specifies the above type of pluralism as
"hyperpluralism," see Dahl (I982:chap. 4). On "organi-
zational pluralism," see Hicks and Lechner (this volume).
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economic constitution may require considerable
repression. Not only may this infringe on the
very liberty it is claimed to protect, but it may
also become too demanding on the state and re-
sult in an overturn not just of the government,
but of the republic as well.
The paradoxes of liberalism become partic-
ularly obvious where collective organization is
related to social class. Working class collectivism
in nineteenth-century Europe was partly a rem-
nant of premodern feudal society. But it also of-
fered protection against a liberal economy that
subjected sellers oflabor power to the same self-
regulating markets as owners of capital. Trade
unions and mass parties enabled the working
class to take advantage of freedom of contract
and of democracy and share in the benefits of
the new order (Marshall, 1964). That they in-
terfered with the free play of market forces and
intervened between the individual and the state
mattered less for them.
A state attacking working class organization
in the name of either political individualism or
free labor markets risked being perceived by
a sizeable number of its citizens as an instru-
ment of class rule. As the nineteenth century
went on, then, the question became how to
accommodate organized collectivities in a lib-
eral polity and free-market economy. Appar-
ently national societies were too large and too
heterogeneous for the state to be their only focus
of social integration and political loyalty - just
as the market was too anonymous and unpre-
dictable for individuals, especially those who
had nothing to sell but their labor power, to have
confidence in it without additional protection.
The stubborn persistence of collectivism inside
the nation-state and the market indicated that
the Rousseauian program of atomistic republi-
canism was in need of amendment.
If factions were unavoidable, and rooting
them out was either impossible or possible
only at the price of liberty or domestic peace,
what status to assign to them in a modern
political order? In Germany and the coun-
tries where German intellectual influence was
strong, Hegel's Philosophy of Right (1983 [1820]),
which described corporate associations -
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Korporationen - as the "second moral root" of
the state alongside the family, was read by some
as a call for a return from egalitarian parliamen-
tar ism to a corporatist state of estates. Thus Adam
Mueller (1922 [1809]) developed for Metter-
nich the concept of a Klassenstaat (class state)
in which organized groups would jointly reg-
ulate production and coordinate their interests
through negotiations, in ways radically differ-
ent from French liberalism and Adam Smith's
market economy. Although this never became
more than a constitutional blueprint, it later pro-
vided the background for a search for a synthe-
sis between liberal and traditional elements of
political order. Given that countries like Ger-
many had not gone through a radical-liberal
Jacobine revolution, the inclusion in the mod-
ern state of group-based forms of nonmajori-
tarian governance seemed less paradoxical there
than in France, where this required the over-
throw of a revolutionary tradition (Lehmbruch,
2001).
By the end of the nineteenth century, the
liberal program was challenged by various sorts
of collectivism in the name of a need for so-
cial reconstruction after what was widely re-
garded as a failure of the "liberal experiment"
(Polanyi, 1944). To the European Right, a cor-
poratist Standestaat remained an alternative to
liberal democracy well into the interwar period
of the twentieth century. Corporatist thinking
deplored the disorder and social conflict brought
about by party competition and the market
economy. Catholic social doctrine, in its attempt
to limit the power of the national state with
its liberal-secular tendencies in general, and its
antagonism toward Roman Catholic "interna-
tionalism" in particular, favored political rep-
resentation on the basis of professional groups,
sometimes with and sometimes without inde-
pendent trade unions. It also insisted on the
"natural" right of subnational, or prenational,
social groups to an autonomous conduct of their
affairs, mainly in defense of Catholic charities
and schools against being absorbed in compul-
sory national social security and educational sys-
tems. In countries with a significant Catholic
community, this issued in a constitutional
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principle of "subsidiarity," under which the
state must refrain from activities that smaller so-
cial entities can perform by themselves and in-
deed is obliged to help them independently to
govern their affairs.
More radical corporatists proposed to resolve
the social and economic crises of modernity by
compulsory organization of society along the
lines of industrial sectors and producer groups,
which were to serve as the modern equivalents
of the guilds and estates of the past. Joint organi-
zation of workers and employers as "producers"
in "vertical" sectoral corporations was to put an
end to class conflict and replace it with coopera-
tion in production. Represented by hierarchical
organizational structures, the relations of coop-
eration, competition, and exchange that made
up the industrial economy were to be returned
to political control. Mussolini in Italy, Franco in
Spain, and Salazar in Portugal conceived of the
political organization of the corporatist state as
reflecting the organic structure of society and its
economic organization, thus providing for supe-
rior governability in the national interest com-
pared to the conflict and disorder caused by the
abstract formalism of parliamentary democracy
and by the vagaries of free markets. Whereas tra-
ditional corporatists had called upon organized
groups to limit the power of the modern state,
the state corporatism of the twentieth century
tried to use corporatist organization as an in-
strument of state rule.
Antiparliamentarism was not confined to the
Right, and neither was the idea of a political and
economic order based on corporate associations
instead of individuals (Table 22.1). Syndical-
ism, anarcho-syndicalism, guild socialism and
similar movements, which survived in different
strength in a number of countries until World
War II, strove for a polity of self-governing "pro-
ducer groups" that had neither place nor need
for capitalists, state bureaucrats, parliaments, and
political parties. Workers councils - Rate in
German and Soviets in Russian - freely elected
and easily recalled by their constituents, the "as-
sociated producers," were to take the place of
both the market and the state. Councils were to
plan the economy democratically from below,
overcome the "anarchy of the market" by con-
sensually adjusting production to the needs of
society, end the extraction of surplus value, and
as a result make organized repression by a bu-
reaucratic state apparatus unnecessary. Left syn-
dicalist corporatism shared with the corporatism
of the Right its collectivism and its rejection
of the liberal state and the market economy,
while it differed from it in its anticapitalism,
antinationalism, and antistatism, as well as in its
progressive culture and politics (Korsch, 1969
[1922]).
Why did both Left and Right versions of
a corporatist political order fail to become a
viable alternative to the modern nation-state?
One reason was that a polity based on orga-
nized producer groups tended to be incompat-
ible with the social and economic dynamism
of a modern economy and society. As Max
Weber (1964:221 ff.; 2002 [1918]) had already
pointed out, a Standestaat presupposes a static so-
cial structure that makes it possible to assign each
individual to one of a small number of broad
but still internally homogeneous social cate-
gories. The more dynamic a society becomes,
Weber argued, the more frequently individuals
have to be reassigned, new categories created
and others abolished, while the total number of
groups would be continuously rising with grow-
ing functional differentiation. A polity modeled
after the group structure of a modern society
would therefore be ultimately unmanageable.
Similarly, economic corporatism, such as syn-
dicalism or any other form of "producer-based
democracy," would be governed by producer
conservatism resisting adjustment of production
to changing demand. Ultimately it must amount
to a dictatorship of producers over consumers,
acceptable only in a world of stable technol-
ogy and static, traditionalist demand for a nar-
row range of elementary products and services.
Indeed in the real world, no corporatist or-
der, whether rightist or leftist, ever survived for
more than a few years. In the Soviet Union as
well as in the right-wing corporatist regimes of
the interwar period, the councils and syndicates
that were supposed to be the ultimate author-
ity soon came under the control of a dictato-
rial state party sufficiently detached from the
social structure to override static group interests
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in the name of economic progress or military
mobilization. What on the surface remained a
corporatist constitution soon became a facade
for dictatorial state rule.
An alternative to liberalism on the one
hand and syndicalism, the Stdndestaat, and state
corporatism on the other were attempts to ac-
commodate organized groups in liberal demo-
cratic polities and find some form of coex-
istence of territorially and functionally based
political representation. In the United States in
particular, but to differing degrees also in the
other Anglo-American countries, this involved
recognition of organized collectivities as inter-
est groups, with constitutional rights to lobby
the democratically elected parliament. "Plural-
ist" admission of organized interests was con-
ditional on acceptance by the latter of a strict
division between themselves and state author-
ity. To prevent organized interests from "captur-
ing" the state, membership in them had to be
strictly voluntary and their organizations prefer-
ably small, specialized, internally homogeneous,
democratic, and in constant competition with
each other and with other organizations under-
taking to represent the same interests (Truman,
1951) .
In Continental Europe by comparison, Ro-
man Catholic and social democratic traditions
merged to give rise to various forms of "sharing
public spaces" between states and organized so-
cial groups (Crouch, 1993). Subnational com-
munities that the rising nation-state had been
unable or unwilling to break up were con-
ceded semipublic authority to make binding ci-
sions for and enter into commitments on behalf
of their members, in exchange for coordinat-
ing their core activities with the government.
Social groups that were allowed various forms
of self-government in the public domain, typi-
cally under de facto obligatory if not compul-
sory membership, included churches, farmers,
unions, employers, small business, and the lib-
eral professions. The resulting blurring of the
boundary between the state and civil society in-
volved a delicate balance between individualism
and collectivism, individual rights and group
rights, and competition and cooperation. The
integration of organized groups into both lib-
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eral parliamentary democracy and the market
economy reached its high point in a number of
European countries after World War II. In the
1970s, it came to be referred to as neocorpo-
ratism or liberal corporatism.
One of the first to provide a coherent ra-
tionale for a liberal corporatist political order
was the French sociologist Emile Durkheim
(1858-1917). In the Preface to the 1902 second
edition of his Division of Labor in Society (1893) -
titled "Some Notes on Occupational Groups" -
Durkheim reminded the reader of the main
result of his investigation, namely that the pro-
gressive functional differentiation of modern so-
ciety is a source of both disorder and order, of
anarchy and anomy as well as of social integra-
tion. Anomy, according to Durkheim, is caused
by the rise of "industrial society" and the in-
creasing importance in social life of a highly dif-
ferentiated economy, whereas integration may
result from mutual interdependence of actors
specializing on different activities. For inter-
dependence to result in cooperation, however,
mutual trust is required, which in turn pre-
supposes reliable rules. These a liberal state
cannot on its own provide: "Economic life,
because it is specialized and grows more special-
ized every day, escapes (the state's) competence
and... action" (Durkheim, 1964 [1893]:5).
This is no longer so if "professional associations"
organized to reflect the structure of economic
relations are charged with elaborating the gen-
eral rules made by the state to fit their special cir-
cumstances (Durkheim, 1964 [1893]:25). Cor-
porate associations are also optimally suited to
enforce professional codes of conduct, provide
mutual assistance, regulate professional training,
and so on. "A society," Durkheim concluded,
"composed of an infinite number of unorga-
nized individuals, that a hypertrophied state is
forced to oppress and contain, constitutes a ver-
itable sociological monstrosity. .. A nation can
be maintained only if, between the state and the
individual, there is intercalated a whole series of
secondary groups near enough to the individ-
uals to attract them strongly in their sphere of
action and, in this way, drag them into the gen-
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DEMOCRATIC STATE BUILDING, FREE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, AND
NEOCORPORATISM AFTER 1945
The "postwar settlement" in the European
countries under American influence after 1945
was a successful attempt to reconcile a capi-
talist economy with mass democracy and pre-
vent a return of the political and social divi-
sions that had destabilized Europe in the inter-
war period. Central to it was the neocorporatist
inclusion of worker collectivism in the liber-
alized political economies of the reconstructed
European nation-states. Like in World War I,
labor inclusion was prefigured by wartime poli-
cies of national unity. It was also a consequence
of the leading role of the Left in antifascist re-
sistance movements, the collaboration of tradi-
tional elites with right-wing governments or the
German occupation, and the presence of a com-
munist alternative to capitalism in Eastern Eu-
rope. Where the institutionalization of national
systems of industrial relations involved the ex-
tension of collective rights to organized labor
at the level of the national polity, it followed
the model of other nonmajoritarian constitu-
tional provisions in countries whose cohesion
depended on protection of ethnic or religious
groups from being overruled by natural ma-
jorities ("consociational democracies"; Lehm-
bruch, 1974; Lijphart, 1984; Rokkan, 1966).
The incorporation oflabor in postwar demo-
cratic capitalism as a separately organized
group - unlike the vertical corporations of state
corporatism that also included capitalists - had
developed out of the institution of "free collec-
tive bargaining." Rooted in nineteenth-century
Britain, free collective bargaining emerged
where states recognized their inability to sup-
press the collective action and organization of
workers, short of civil war with uncertain event.
Where trade unions, like British craft unions in
the mid-eighteenth century, were prepared to
pursue their interests primarily in the economic
sphere, governments were happy to abstain from
direct intervention in a class conflict they found
difficult if not impossible to pacify. Instead
they let unions and employers set the terms of
employment between themselves, increasingly
under legal immunities, protection, and even
facilitation. As T. H. Marshall (1964) pointed
out, collective industrial agreements could be
regarded by governments as economic contracts
negotiated in the market, and thus as an outflow
of civil rights rather than as coercion by illegit-
imate political force. Whereas private compul-
sion would have challenged the territorial state's
monopoly of force, private contracts were in a
liberal order properly left to themselves.
Free collective bargaining became widely es-
tablished immediately after World War I, only
to be eliminated again in the 1920S and 1930S in
many countries in the name of national unity,
individual liberty, free competition, economic
planning, or all of the above. Its worldwide
return after 1945 was part of the complex po-
litical compromise that was the postwar settle-
ment. Using different legal instruments, demo-
cratic states exempted unions from conspiracy
and anticartel laws and accepted national col-
lective wage bargaining as a major element of
the machinery of public economic policy. In
return, unions in the tradition of social demo-
cratic reformism recognized private property,
free markets and the primacy of parliamentary
democracy, limiting themselves to the direct
pursuit of economic goals through collective
bargaining and to the indirect pursuit of political
goals through lobbying the parliament and sup-
porting sympathetic political parties. Whereas
government refrained from direct intervention
in wage setting - let alone enforcing free price
formation in the labor market - unions gave
up previous ambitions to put themselves in the
place of the government or the state, in ex-
change for being recognized as legitimate co-
governors of the emerging postwar democratic
welfare state. The successful integration of the
trade union movement in the liberal political
order was indicated by its gradual abandonment
of the political strike and its more or less explicit
concession to use the strike only for economic
purposes.
Although the legal and political forms in
which free collective bargaining became insti-
tutionalized differed between countries, from
the perspective of the state the new group
rights were granted on condition that they were
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responsibly exercised. Unions, for their part,
insisted that their autonomy in representing
their members was not derived from the state,
but reflected rights that preceded the modern
state and its constitution. Even for more re-
formist unions, conceiving of free collective
bargaining as a conditional privilege granted
by the state was no more than legal fiction. In
their view, collective bargaining ultimately re-
sulted, not from the state, but from the capacity
of workers collectively to withdraw their labor
and bring the economy to a halt. Generally in
neocorporatist arrangements, whether collec-
tive rights are original or delegated by the state
often was deliberately left open to avoid conflict.
What exactly the status of unions was in the
postwar settlement - part of the state, or "state
in the state" - was not just a legal subtlety. In
most European countries, responsible behavior
of unions in collective bargaining could not ef-
fectively be enforced on them by hierarchical
means. As states had to respect free collective
bargaining - for constitutional reasons, for rea-
sons of political expediency, or both - union re-
sponsiveness to the needs of national economic
policy became a matter, not of authority, but
of political exchange (Pizzorno, 1978), in which
government paid for union cooperation with a
wide range of political side payments. The sta-
bility of the postwar political economy thus de-
pended on a precarious give-and-take between
government, business, and the organized eco-
nomic interests of the working class, in which
social and political integration were purchased
by the provision of material benefits rather than
enforced by coercive state authority.
Postwar democratic corporatism involved the
inclusion of organized labor not only at the
workplace, but also in national politics. Also,
the "corporations" on which neocorporatism
is based are not large firms - as the concept
might suggest especially to speakers of Ameri-
can English - but intermediary associations of
groups of individuals or firms in similar posi-
tions and, as a consequence, potentially com-
peting with one another. Reference to the
Japanese case as one of" corporatism without
labor" (Pempel and Tsunakawa, 1979) is there-
fore to be qualified in two respects at least. First,
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with the abortive general strike of 1949 and
the firm establishment of enterprise unionism
in the 1950S, Japanese trade unionism had be-
come effectively eliminated as a national po-
litical force. Second, inclusion of labor at the
enterprise level only, although it is inclusion in
"corporations" and may also give rise to exten-
sive labor-management cooperation, is not cor-
poratism as it is not based on associations capable
of suspending market competition. It is there-
fore better referred to as enterprise paternalism
(Streeck, 200 I).
In Western postwar democracies, unions that
used their autonomy responsibly became recog-
nized, in practice if not in law, as performing a
public function that the liberal democratic state
found difficult to perform: the creation of so-
cial order and the provision of social peace at
the workplace. With time, what had originally
been a struggle for power between workers as-
sociations and the modern state could thus be
redefined, in a Durkheimian way, as a matter of
an efficient allocation of functions between pri-
vate and public organizations together govern-
ing the public domain. To compensate unions
for wage and political moderation, states granted
them legal privileges and institutional guaran-
tees, again to different degrees and in different
ways in different countries. Unions were also
invited to share in a wide range of economic
policies in tripartite arrangements that included
them together with employers and the govern-
ment, making trade unionism part of the public
policy machinery and of the implicit constitu-
tion of postwar democracy. In this way, the orga-
nized collectivism of the working class became
integrated in liberal democracy and the mar-
ket economy, conditional on its political and
economic moderation as well as on the abil-
ity of the reconstituted nation-state to provide
for material prosperity and organizational sup-
port.
NEOCORPORATISM: ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL FUNCTIONS
In the 1970s, political science and sociology dis-
covered neocorporatism as a European anomaly
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from the perspective of what had in the mean-
time become a predominantly American, plu-
ralist theory of interest politics. Authoritarian
state corporatism of the Portuguese and Spanish
sort, and various Latin American dictatorships
modeled after it, were still around. They
provided the backdrop for the observation that
in many, now perfectly democratic, European
countries, interest groups were organized and
behaved in ways reminiscent of corporatist sys-
tems. Research on interest-group corporatism
in liberal democratic polities centered on two
subjects in particular: on the organizational
structure of interest groups and on the way
these were made to act in line with more
general, public interests. A central topic became
the relationship between, on the one hand, the
organization of group interests in established
intermediary associations (the structuralaspect of
neocorporatism) and, on the other, the political
coordination between interest associations and
the state (the functional aspect; Lehmbruch and
Schmitter, 1982).
As a system of interest organization, demo-
cratic neocorporatism has been conveniently
described in relation to interest-group pluralism,
sometimes as its polar, ideal-typical opposite and
sometimes as a variant of it (Hicks and Esping-
Andersen, this volume). In structural terms,
pluralist theory most commonly conceives of
interest politics as free competition among a
variety of organizations in a market for political
representation, whereas in corporatist systems
selected organizations enjoy a representational
monopoly. Organizational autonomy under
pluralism contrasts with direct or indirect state
intervention in the internal affairs and the struc-
tural makeup of interest organizations under
corporatism, favoring members over leaders or
leaders over members depending on who is ex-
pected to be more reasonable from the perspec-
tive of state policy.
With respect to function, under pluralism
organized interests are tamed by competition
and the primacy of public legislation, whereas
corporatism depends on political incentives and
sanctions to make interest groups cooperate with
public purposes. Unlike the sharp division in
liberal democratic theory between hierarchical
state authority and the voluntary organization
of civil society, corporatist theory and practice
blur the boundary between state and society
as the state shares authority with private
interest associations, using the latter as agents
of public policy by coordinating their behavior
or delegating public functions and decisions
to them. In a corporatist context, private
interest representation thus shades into public
governance. In the pluralist view, organized
interests are relegated to the input side of the
political process, where they may have a right
to be heard before decisions are made. Under
corporatism, by comparison, social interests
participate not only in the making of binding
decisions but also in their implementation. As
corporatist associations assume responsibility
for the compliance of their members with
public policies, they help the state overcome
inherent limits of legal regulation and direct
intervention.
The pluralism-corporatism distinction may
be read either as one between two types of gov-
ernment or between the ideal world of liberal
theory and the real world. It is often taken to sig-
nify the extreme ends of a continuum on which
extant regimes of interest politics in liberal
democracies can be located. Whereas originally
there was a tendency to classify entire societies,
or polities, in terms of their being more or less
corporatist, later on the discussion became more
subtle and allowed for different sectors in a soci-
ety to be differently corporatist in their organi-
zation and policy making ("macro" vs. "meso"
corporatism; Cawson, 1985). The same applied
at the regional level where corporatist gover-
nance arrangements and practices were claimed
to have emerged without the support of the
national state. Moreover, in addition to the co-
existence of different types of state-society re-
lations in a given country, it was realized that
even interest groups that were organized in a
corporatist fashion sometimes relied on pluralist
pressure tactics in pursuit of their objectives, or
used pluralist and corporatist strategies simulta-
neously. Vice versa, interest groups were found
to behave responsibly and cooperate with state
policies even in the absence of corporatist or-
ganizational structures. Over time, research also
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began to extend to organized groups represent-
ing less vested interests than unions and business
associations, such as charities and social move-
ments concerned with issues like the environ-
ment. These, too, were studied in terms of the
more or less pluralist or corporatist character of
their structures and relations with the state.
As to the functional aspects of corporatist
arrangements, it is helpful to distinguish be-
tween concertation and self-government. Concer-
tation refers to efforts by national governments
to make unions and employers exercise their
right to free collective bargaining in such a way
that it is not at odds with national economic
objectives; it turns collective bargaining and
its agents into instruments of macroeconomic
management coordinated between the state and
organized social groups that command indepen-
dent political capacities. The principal example
is tripartite incomes policies, first under Keyne-
sianism and, in the 1990S, in national employ-
ment pacts. Concertation achieves moderation
of wage demands through extended or "gen-
eralized" political exchange, offering unions in
particular a variety of material or institutional
concessions to make them behave "in concert"
with government policies.
Self-government, by comparison, involves
diverse forms of collective participation of or-
ganized groups in public policy at the national
or subnationallevel. It may result from accom-
modation by the state of powerful group in-
terests or from technically expedient devolu-
tion of state functions to organized civil society.
It may also result from social groups cooper-
atively producing collective goods for them-
selves that state and market fail to provide, or
from any mixture of the above. Collective self-
government, with varying degrees of state fa-
cilitation and legal formalization, may relieve
the state from demands for regulation or ser-
vices that it would find difficult to satisfY, but
it also may amount to particularistic capture of
public authority. It can therefore be analyzed
from both a power and a problem-solving per-
spective. Self-government is often found in the
cooperative - "third" - sector of the economy
where groups operating between the hierarchy
of the state and commercial markets provide
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themselves with collective goods, or where -
like at the regional level - hierarchical state au-
thority is not present. Generally, whereas con-
certation regulates the relationship - the terms
of exchange - between economic groups differ-
ently located in the economic division oflabor,
self-government involves cooperation between
competitors in pursuit of common objectives,
sometimes on the basis of explicit bipartite
agreements with the state. Whereas concerta-
tion serves to contain distributional conflict,
self-government mobilizes the economic ben-
efits of cooperation.
Unlike pluralism, democratic corporatism
lacks a coherent normative justification. The
memories of antidemocratic, authoritarian state
corporatism linger on and make corporatist
ideas suspect. Catholic advocacy of the sub-
sidiarity principle carries with it a traditional
communitarianism that conflicts with the mod-
ernist and statist tradition of social democracy.
Leftist support for collective bargaining, in turn,
is often accompanied by fears of loss of union
autonomy due to incorporation in government
economic policy, and by rejection of "class col-
laboration." Social democratic hopes for state
intervention to bring about greater equality also
stand in the way of unambiguous support for
corporatism. Liberals eschew corporatism for its
anticompetitive, monopolistic institutions and
its inherent collectivism. Conservatives, often
together with the republican Left, fear for the
unity and integrity of the state. Whereas the for-
mer associate corporatism with a "trade union
state," the latter are afraid of state capture by
special sectoral or business interests using priv-
ileged institutional positions to block majority
decisions. Democratic theory warns of a "cartel
of elites" rendering the parliament power-
less, while economic theory deplores the rent-
seeking and the allocative inefficiency allegedly
caused by suspension of competitive markets.
Fears of a totalitarian state takeover of civil soci-
ety exist alongside fears of the conflicts inherent
in the latter tearing apart the state or making it
subservient to democratically illegitimate spe-
cial interests.
In the following subsections we first discuss
neocorporatist organization, that is, the structural
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dimension of corporatism. Following this we
turn to the functional aspects of neocorporatism,
addressing concertation and self-government in
turn.
Structure: Organization
Regarding structure, neocorporatist interest or-
ganization differs from its pluralist counterpart
in that collective interests are organized in few
rather than many organizations, which are broad
instead of narrow in their domain and central-
ized and broadly based instead of specialized and
fragmented (Schmitter, 1974). Interest differ-
ences between constituent groups are as much
as possible internalized in encompassing orga-
nizations, and the management of interest di-
versity becomes in large part a matter of the
internal politics of associations instead of the
public political process. Charging associational
leaders with the aggregation and transformation
of diverse special interests into more broadly de-
fined common, adjusted interests, corporatist or-
ganization allows them considerable discretion
in selecting which interests to represent and act
upon as those of their members. Corporatist as-
sociations can therefore be seen as active pro-
ducers instead of mere purveyors of collective
interests.
Corporatist organizational form affects the
substance of collective interests in a variety of
ways. The higher discretion enjoyed by the lead-
ers of encompassing associations enables them
to observe technical considerations in addition
to political ones. Technical perspectives are in-
jected in the internal deliberations of associa-
tions, especially by professional experts based in
staff departments that smaller organizations can-
not afford. Experts are crucial in defining col-
lective goals more instrumentally, making them
more acceptable to the organization's interlocu-
tors (more "moderate") and thus more likely
to be accomplished (more "realistic"). Leader-
ship autonomy also makes it possible for cor-
poratist associations to take a long-term view
of collective goals and postpone the gratifi-
cation of demands, for example, in the hope
of expanding the resources available for distri-
bution. This enables associations to enter into
stable relations of "generalized political ex-
change," where present concessions may be
traded for as yet undetermined and legally not
enforceable future rewards. It is these and similar
processes of interest definition and adjustment
that distinguish corporatist interest intermediation
from pluralist interest representation and indicate
the transformation of a pluralist interest group
into an intermediary organization.
The rise of interest intermediation may in
part be attributed to internal factors, such as the
interests of professional staff in safe jobs, ca-
reer advancement, and acceptance by a larger
professional community. This mechanism fig-
ures prominently already in the writings of Max
Weber (1964:841ff.) and Robert Michels (1989
[19II 1r92 5]). Staff interests represent the eco-
nomics of organization, such as the need to
protect past investment in collective action
capacities by regularizing the existence of the
organization. In addition, the literature on neo-
corporatism also points to external factors con-
tributing to what Schmitter and Streeck (1999
[I9 82]) call organizational development, in par-
ticular incentives held out and supports pro-
vided by the state and other interlocutors. The
reason why the latter might favor corporatist
intermediation over pluralist representation is
the political moderation they can expect to come
with large size, encompassingness, professional-
ization, organizational continuity, and central-
ization. Large and stable organizations not only
develop powerful interests in their own sur-
vival that militate against political adventures,
but they can also negotiate on a broader range
of issues, which increases the variety of possi-
ble package deals. Moreover, as Mancur Olson
(1982) has explained, encompassing organiza-
tions internalize not only a diversity of special
interests but also much of the damage they do if
they stray too far from the general interest.
There are several inducements and supports
the state and other actors can offer interest
groups to persuade them to assume corpo-
ratist organizational forms. To help overcome
pluralist fragmentation, interlocutors may talk
only to organizations that exceed a certain size
or qualifY as majority representative of their
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constituency. Privileged access strengthens the
position of the leadership in relation to the
members, as these cannot hope to be effec-
tively represented if they join a competing orga-
nization. Elimination of competition may also
contribute to political moderation as it relieves
leaders of the need to outbid each other in
militant demands potentially more appealing to
the membership than moderate policies. Inter-
locutors furthermore may provide associations
with material support, to enable them to build
a strong bureaucracy and offer their members
"outside inducements" (Olson, 1971) - services
that unlike their political achievements they
can withhold from nonmembers to increase the
appeal of membership.
External support for organizational develop-
ment and political moderation may include tacit
or open assistance in recruiting or retaining
members, which can take a variety of forms
from moral suasion to compulsory membership
(like in Chambers of Commerce and Indus-
try in some Continental European countries).
Assistance with recruitment helps associations
deal with the "free rider" problems that increase
as their policies become more compatible with
general, public policies. Here in particular neo-
corporatist interest organization becomes rem-
iniscent of traditional corporatism, also because
organizational assistance may be accompanied
by - more or less subtle - intervention in an
association's internal process, in the name of as-
sociational democracy or political moderation.
Unlike state corporatism, however, intermedi-
ary organizations in liberal democracies remain
ultimately tree to refuse cooperation with the
government, regardless of the extent to which
the state may help them with their organiza-
tional problems.
In a simplified model, the organizational dy-
namics of intermediary organizations derives
from their simultaneous involvement in two
environments, the social group from which
they draw their members (membership environ-
ment) and the collective actors in relation to
which they represent these (influenceenvironment;
Figure 22.1). The two environments are gov-
erned by different "logics" (Schmitter and
Streeck, 1999 [1982)). Interaction between an
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interest organization and its constituents is shaped
by the interest perceptions and demands of the
latter, by the willingness of the members to
comply with decisions made on their behalf,
by the means available to the organization for
controlling its members, and by the collective
benefits and outside inducements the organiza-
tion has to offer. Together these constitute an
organization's logic if membership. The interac-
tion between an interest organization and its in-
terlocutors is governed by the demands the orga-
nization makes on the latter, the support it has
to offer to them, the compromises it is willing
and able to negotiate, and the extent to which
it can "deliver" its constituents - as well as by
the constraints and opportunities inherent in the
relevant political institutions, especially for the
establishment oflasting relations of political ex-
change, the concessions offered to the organi-
zation, and the degree to which the organiza-
tion is granted privileged access and status. This
interaction reflects the organization's logic if in-
fluence.
As the demands made on intermediary or-
ganizations by their members and interlocutors
may be contradictory, their leaders typically
confront difficult choices. Interest representa-
tion in a pluralist mode is controlled by the
logic of membership and emphasizes the au-
thentic representation of members' interest per-
ceptions and articulated demands. Political in-
fluence, however, often depends on a capacity to
moderate and compromise member demands,
and so may a stable supply of organizational re-
sources. However, if interest associations adapt
to the logic of influence, they are drawn away
from their members and into their target en-
vironment, in the process assuming corporatist
traits. For example, whereas the logic of mem-
bership speaks for the formation of homoge-
neous and, by implication, small ("pluralist")
organizations, the logic of influence tends to
place a premium on interest organizations being
broadly based and representing more general in-
stead of higWy special interests. To build lasting
relations of political exchange with their inter-
locutors and thereby enhance their own stability
and security, interest organizations may have to
acquire organizational characteristics that make

























be seen as arbitrage between markets for mem-
bership and influence. Pluralist interest repre-
sentation transforms the interest perceptions of
its clients into political demands and extracts
concessions from its interlocutors to provide
its constituents with collective benefits (Figure
22. r). Neocorporatist interest intermediation in
addition exchanges member discipline for orga-
nizational privileges under the logic of influ-
ence, and private governance for member com-
pliance under the logic of membership. In this
it uses the compliance of its members as a re-
source in its dealings with its interlocutors, just
as it relies on its organizational privileges in
turning its constituents into members, trying
to keep an equal distance between the differ-
ent dictates of the logics of membership and
influence by drawing on one to stay clear of the
other.
Figure 22. I. The Logics of Membership and Influence.
it more difficult for them to procure legitimacy
for themselves under the logic of membership.
In fact, intermediary organizations that become
too distant from their members and too closely
involved in the logic of influence may turn into
extended arms of the government (i.e., into
quasi-governmental agencies) or become repre-
sentatives of interests opposed to those of their
constituents ("yellow unions").
Striking a balance between member-res-
ponsive but weakly organized, fragmented, and
competitive pluralism on the one hand and cor-
poratist institutionalization in their target en-
vironment on the other is the central political
and organizational problem of neocorporatist
interest intermediation. Successful intermedia-
tion requires stable relations of exchange with
environments subject to different and sometimes
contradictory logics of action; in a sense it may
i.._
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Function: Concertation
The literature on national neocorporatist "con-
certation" reached a first peak in the late 1970S
and early 1980s. It focused on the management
of national economies after the wave of worker
militancy in the late 1960s and the oil shocks of
1973 and 1979 (Cameron, 1984; Crouch, 1985;
Katzenstein, 1985; Lange and Garrett, 1985;
Pizzorno, 1979; Scharpf, 1987; Schmidt, 1982).
The issue was what government and employ-
ers could do to make unions that had become
stronger than ever moderate their wage demands
in the context of a negotiated incomes policy,
where statutory incomes policies were impossi-
ble for constitutional, technical, or political rea-
sons. Tripartite national policies agreed between
government, employers, and unions were to
safeguard macroeconomic objectives such as low
inflation, low unemployment, a stable exchange
rate, and high growth while respecting the right
of unions and employers to free collective bar-
gaining. Neocorporatist concertation efforts re-
flected a Keynesian political economy in which
full employment was a responsibility of the gov-
ernment that it had to live up to if it wanted
to survive politically, and for which it had in
principle the necessary tools available in the
form of fiscal and monetary intervention. Po-
litically guaranteed full employment, however,
increased union bargaining power and thereby
gave rise to inflation, unless unions could be
persuaded not to use their bargaining power to
the fullest.
The neocorporatist literature of the time
identified a variety of concessions govern-
ments and employers offered to unions in
tripartite package deals, including tax relief
for low-income earners, more progressive in-
come taxes, improved pension benefits, ac-
tive labor market policies, increased educational
spending, growth-promoting infrastructural in-
vestment, expanded rights to workplace rep-
resentation, and organizational security. Com-
parative research explored whether countries
that succeeded in negotiating tripartite national
agreements performed better economically than
liberal or pluralist countries with more adversar-
ial institutions and practices. Research also tried
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to specify the conditions under which tripartite
deals were achieved, such as the political com-
plexion of the national government, the degree
of independence of the central bank, or the size
of the country. Much attention was paid to the
organizational structure of unions and employer
associations, especially whether they conformed
to a corporatist pattern or not and whether con-
certation and cooperation between the state and
organized groups was possible also with a more
fragmented and pluralist structure of industrial
relations.
For a while, neocorporatist concertation
seemed a generally applicable recipe for the joint
management of a Keynesian political economy
by a democratic state and independently orga-
nized social interests. It soon turned out, how-
ever, that concertation was difficult to trans-
port to countries like the United Kingdom with
traditionally fragmented and adversarial inter-
est groups. Moreover, the concessions that had
to be made to unions became more expensive
with time and more often than not only moved
inflation forward into the future or caused an
accumulation of public debt. Not least, unions
frequently failed to deliver on their promises of
wage moderation as they came under pressure
from their members. In other cases, cooperative
unions suffered a loss of confidence on the part
of their constituents, which ultimately forced
them to withdraw from concertation.
In the early 1980s, the neoconservative gov-
ernments of the United States and Great Britain
proved that labor-exclusive monetarist methods
of bringing down inflation were not only effec-
tive but also politically sustainable, even though
they involved high rates of unemployment. As
inflation rates in OECD countries declined and
converged at a historic low, research on corpo-
ratism shifted from incomes policy and demand
management to collective infrastructures, like
support for vocational training and technologi-
cal innovation, that both free markets and state
hierarchies seemed to have difficulty providing
on their own. Again the question was whether
corporatist organization of social groups and co-
operation between them and the state resulted
in better economic performance than a plural-
ist separation of state and society that left the
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economy to the free play of market forces. Al-
though requisite organizational forms remained
an issue, most of the research on "supply-side
corporatism" looked at subnational regional,
sectoral, or workplace-level institutions pro-
moting cooperation between state and society
or between competitors, rather than the national
arrangements and macroeconomic policies that
had been at the center of early research on cor-
poratism (Streeck, 1984, 1992).
Research on national incomes policies re-
vived in the 1990S in the context of efforts of
European governments to bring down persis-
tent unemployment and meet the strict crite-
ria for accession to European Monetary Union
(Pochet and Fajertag, 2000). National employ-
ment and stability pacts were proposed and ne-
gotiated that aimed at bringing union wage-
setting behavior in line with the imperatives
of a monetarist macroeconomic policy and the
need, resulting not least from the neocorpo-
ratist bargaining of the 1970s, to consolidate
public budgets (Ebbinghaus and Hassel, 2000).
Pacts also involved sometimes far-reaching re-
forms of social security (Baccaro, 2002). Union
cooperation with governments seemed to de-
pend on a variety of factors. Unlike in the
1970s, however, governments of the Left were
not significantly more successful than conserva-
tive governments in negotiating national pacts.
Moreover, whether the organizational structure
of national unions was corporatist or not seemed
to be largely irrelevant (Regini, 2000).
Function: Self-Government
Much of the political science literature of the
1980s was concerned with the limits of state in-
tervention and of the problem-solving capacity
of governments. Whereas traditionally attention
had focused on the input side of political sys-
tems, it now shifted to the technical difficulties
facing legislators and state bureaucracies on the
output side: for example, in fine-tuning policies
to meet increasingly differentiated needs and in
ensuring that programs were correctly imple-
mented. In Europe it was in the context of rising
disillusion with social democratic pretensions at
political planning - the end of the "planning
euphoria" of the 1960s and 1970S - that debates
began to revolve around a need for Staatsentlas-
tung, or relief of the state from an overgrown
policy agenda (Scharpf, 1992).
Perceptions of state failure coincided with a
tendency in Western societies at the time toward
privatization of state activities and deregulation
of markets. The latter was based on an emerg-
ing presumption that a free play of market forces
was better suited to resolve complex issues of
allocation and production than state interven-
tion. There were also, however, attempts to de-
velop an alternative response to the deficiencies
of state intervention, one that avoided the risk
of market failure succeeding state failure. In this
context, a variety of forms of collective par-
ticipation in policy making were rediscovered
that extended far beyond collective bargaining
and the concertation of incomes policies. Some
involved an explicit delegation of governance
functions to parapublic institutions and agencies
offering opportunities for participation to af-
fected social groups. Others licensed organized
groups to regulate matters of common interest
themselves and free from state interference.
Like incomes policy, the incorporation of
interest groups in public policy making may
be explained in terms of both power politics
and functional expediency. From the former
perspective, institutions of self-government are
a concession of the state to the independent
power of social groups and are therefore liable
to turn into private bridgeheads in the public
sphere. From a functional or policy perspective,
self-government increases a society's problem-
solving capacity as it makes for a better interface
and more efficient cooperation between state
and civil society - in a Durkheimian sense draw-
ing on subgroup solidarity as a public resource
and mobilizing the productivity advantages of
cooperation between competitors. Rather than
imposing its policies on society from above or
turning them over to the market, a state in a
neocorporatist system governs in part through
negotiations with and devolution to organized
social groups, using them for public policy func-
tions they are better able to perform than a pub-
lic bureaucracy.
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Taking off from the literature on concerta-
tion, the writings in the 1980s on neocorpo-
ratist devolution of governance to organized
civil society emphasized the potential contri-
bution of interest associations to social order
(Streeck and Schmitter, 1985). Especially in
European countries with corporatist or Catholic
traditions, interest associations were observed to
share in public responsibility in policy sectors
such as product standardization, quality control
and certification, vocational training, environ-
mental regulation, research and development,
and welfare provision. Here, group interests
as defined and acted upon by firmly institu-
tionalized associations seemed to be compatible
with general, public interests, so that associa-
tions could be given both autonomy and au-
thority. Arrangements of this sort were often
bilateral, involving the state and a particular or-
ganized group; they involved groups with ideal
interests, such as churches or new social move-
ments, no less than economic interests like those
of farmers or of firms in particular sectors; and
they tended to be concerned with market regu-
lation or the supply of services or infrastructural
facilities, rather than with the management of
demand.
Group self-government through associa-
tions - the "public use of private organized
interests" (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985) - en-
riches the repertoire of the state and expands the
toolkit of governance. Public recognition and
organizational support are to transform pluralist
interest groups into disciplined "private inter-
est governments," both inducing and enabling
them to define the interests of their members
with a view to their compatibility with the pub-
lic interest. By enlisting the support of associ-
ational self-interest, the state mobilizes expert
information that it would be unable to build
and maintain itself. As association members usu-
ally have more confidence in their representa-
tives than in state bureaucrats, private interest
government also tends to have fewer problems
of legitimacy and greater powers of persuasion
than direct state regulation.
Self-governance also benefits the involved
associations. By assuming responsibility for reg-
ulating the behavior of their members, associ-
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ations achieve institutionalization in the public
sphere and gain in status and security. They and
their members may also prefer self-regulation
over potentially heavy-handed state interven-
tion. Groups may furthermore be afraid of in-
competence on the part of state bureaucracies,
making it unpredictably more costly to be po-
liced by them than by themselves. Governments,
for their part, must be able to identifY situations
when the organized private interest of a social
group can be made compatible with the pub-
lic interest of society. They also must have at
their disposal organizational incentives and ma-
terial compensations by which to move group
interests close enough to the public interest for
the independent pursuit of the former to con-
tribute to the latter. In particular, states must
find ways to prevent a decay of self-government
through "agency capture" by rent-seeking in-
terest groups and to ensure that the power of
organized interests can for the practical purposes
of public policy be treated as devolved and del-
egated public power, even if it is in fact not
derived from the state. Domesticating group in-
terests in this way requires, among other things,
reserve state capacity enabling the government
credibly to threaten direct intervention in case
self-government fails to meet its public respon-
sibilities.
Moving beyond narrower concepts of pri-
vate interest government through associations,
the mainly American literature on "associative
democracy" explores decentralization of deci-
sion making to local actors and facilitation of
cooperation between them as an alternative
to centralized state intervention (Cohen and
Rogers, 1995; Cohen and Sabel, 1997). With
corporatist theory, this literature shares an em-
phasis on self-organization below and within the
state performing functions of rule making and
collective goods production that liberal states
cannot satisfactorily perform. Informed mainly
by research on regional economies drawing on
informal social capital for better economic per-
formance (Trigilia, 1990), theories of associative
democracy attribute less significance than the
corporatist literature to formal organizational
structures. Instead they rely mostly on the cul-
tivation of informal social relations between a
Wolfgang Streeck and Lane Kenworthy
variety oflocal actors united in a search for com-
parative advantage in competition with other
regional economies.
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CORPORATISM
A substantial part of the empirical research on
neocorporatism since the late I970S has con-
sisted of quantitative comparative analysis of
corporatism's economic impact. Numerous at-
tempts have been made to score the eighteen or
so most affluent OECD countries on a corpo-
ratism scale (for detailed discussion see Kenwor-
thy, 2001; Kenworthy and Kittel, 2002). Early
measures focused on interest group structure, of
which there are three chief dimensions: repre-
sentational coverage (e.g., union density), or-
ganizational centralization, and organizational
concentration. Since roughly the mid-I980s,
measures of concertation have played a more
prominent role. These have focused primarily
on the degree of centralization or coordination
of wage setting. Fewer attempts have been made
to measure interest-group participation in pub-
lic policy in general - that is, apart from wage
setting. Many researchers have created compos-
ite corporatism measures that combine infor-
mation about various aspects of interest-group
structure and/or concertation.
Research on the economic effects of corpo-
ratism has focused chiefly on macroeconomic
performance, especially unemployment and in-
flation. Most heavily studied has been the im-
pact of centralized or coordinated wage setting.
Three causal mechanisms have been hypothe-
sized.
First, centralized or coordinated wage set-
ting may yield low unemployment or inflation
by engendering wage restraint. The general logic
is simple, although specific applications can be
complex (Franzese, 1999; OECD, 1997). If em-
ployees bargain aggressively for high wage in-
creases, employers can do five main things in
response: raise productivity, raise prices, reduce
profits paid out to investors, reduce investment,
and/ or reduce the number of employees. When
wages are bargained separately for individual
firms, none of these responses will necessarily
have an adverse short-term effect on employ-
ment or inflation-adjusted wages, which are the
principal concerns of union negotiators. For in-
stance, if a firm raises prices, this is likely to have
little impact on the living standard of its workers.
Even if the firm chooses to reduce employment,
those laid off should be able to find work else-
where as long as wage increases and layoffs are
not generalized throughout the economy. Thus,
where bargaining is decentralized and uncoordi-
nated, there is an incentive for unions to pursue
a strategy of wage militancy.
By contrast, if wage negotiations cover a large
share of the workforce, union bargainers can
be reasonably sure that a large wage increase
will have an adverse impact on their mem-
bers. When firms representing a sizable share of
the economy raise prices, the resulting inflation
offsets or nullifies the wage gains of most
workers. Similarly, if layoffs are economy-
wide, employment opportunities will diminish.
Centralized or coordinated wage setting thus
generates an incentive for wage moderation, as
interest groups are forced by their size and struc-
ture to internalize the negative impact of aggres-
sive bargaining.
Many researchers have assumed a linear rela-
tionship between wage-setting centralization or
coordination and wage restraint. However, some
have proposed that the effect is hump-shaped,
with high and low levels of centralization best
at generating labor cost restraint (Calmfors and
Driffill, 1988). Others contend that corporatist
wage setting yields superior performance out-
comes only in combination with particular types
or levels of central bank independence (Hall and
Franzese, 1998), leftist government (Lange and
Garrett, 1985), unionization (Kittel, 1999), or
public sector unionization (Garrett and Way,
1999). Still others hypothesize that the effect
is both hump-shaped and interactive with cen-
tral bank independence or the monetary regime
(Cukierman and Lippi, 1999; Iversen, 1999).
One glaring weakness of research in this area
is the limited empirical investigation of the as-
sumed causal mechanism. Only a handful of
studies have actually examined the relationship
between wage setting and labor cost devel-
opments (Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Kenworthy,
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1996, 2002; Layard et al., 1991; OECD, 1997;
Traxler et aI., 2001; Traxler and Kittel, 2000).
Most have looked only at the statistical correla-
tion between wage setting and macroeconomic
performance and have simply presumed that the
link between wage setting and labor cost re-
straint, and also between labor cost restraint and
performance outcomes, is as hypothesized.
A second potential link between corporatist
wage setting and unemployment is economic
growth. One of the outcomes of centralized or
coordinated wage determination, achieved ei-
ther informally or explicitly in corporatist pacts,
may be greater investment, which in turn tends
to spur more rapid growth of economic out-
put (Lange and Garrett, 1985). Faster growth,
in turn, increases employment.
A third hypothesized link is government policy.
Policy orientations are seen as a key determinant
of cross-country differences in unemployment.
Policy makers in countries with centralized or
coordinated wage setting are likely to feel more
confident than their counterparts in countries
with fragmented bargaining that labor cost in-
creases will be moderate. Thus, they should tend
to worry less about wage-push inflation. This
may increase their willingness to adopt an ex-
pansive monetary or fiscal policy, an active labor
market policy, or other policies that reduce un-
employment. By contrast, policy makers in na-
tions with less coordinated wage arrangements
may feel compelled to resort to higher levels
of unemployment in order to keep inflation
in check (Hall and Franzese, 1998; Kenworthy,
1996; Soskice, 1990).
Although much of the research on the im-
pact of corporatism on economic performance
centers on wage setting, some studies have em-
phasized union participation in economic pol-
icy making. Unions desire low unemployment.
The more input unions have in economic pol-
icy decisions, the more likely it would seem that
government policies will give priority to fight-
ing unemployment (Compston, 1997). To the
extent that the respective policies are effective,
the result should be lower rates of joblessness.
Although there are some dissenting findings
(OECD, 1997; Smith, 1992; Therborn, 1987;
Western, 2001), most studies have discovered
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an association between corporatist wage set-
ting and low unemployment or inflation in the
1970S and 1980s (Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Calm-
fors and Driffill, 1988; Cameron, 1984; Garrett,
1998; Hall and Franzese, 1998; Hicks and Ken-
worthy, 1998; Iversen, 1999; Janoski, McGill,
and Tinsley, 1997; Kenworthy, 1996, 2002; La-
yard, Nickell, and Jackman, 1991; Scharpf, 1991
[1987]; Soskice, 1990; Traxler et aI., 2001). In
the 1990S, however, inflation rates converged
across affluent OECD nations, and restrictive
monetary policy coupled with growing em-
ployer leverage led to substantial wage restraint
in traditionally noncentralized and uncoordi-
nated countries such as Canada, France, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. Con-
sequently, at least one recent study finds no
effect of corporatist wage arrangements on un-
employment in the 1990S (Kenworthy, 2002).
Empirical analyses of the macroeconomic im-
pact of interest-group participation in policy
making have been considerably less common,
but findings have tended to be favorable, even
into the 1990S (Compston, 1997; Kenworthy,
2002; Traxler et aI., 2001).
The bulk of research on the effects of cor-
poratism has dealt with macroeconomic perfor-
mance, but a number of studies suggest that its
impact may be no less important, and perhaps
more so, for the distribution and redistribution
of income. Unions tend to prefer smaller pay dif-
ferentials, and centralized or coordinated wage
setting increases unions' leverage over the wage
structure. Because differentials are more trans-
parent if wages are set simultaneously and collec-
tively for a large share of the workforce, central-
ization may reinforce union preferences for low
pay differentials. Furthermore, low pay inequal-
ity may be one of the things unions ask from
employers in exchange for pay restraint. Empir-
ical findings have tended to yield strong support
for the hypothesis that corporatist wage setting
is associated with lower pay inequality (Alder-
son and Nielsen, 2002; Iversen, 1999; OECD,
1997; Rowthorn, 1992; Rueda and Pontusson,
2000; Wallerstein, 1999).
There also is reason to expect a link be-
tween corporatism and the redistributive ef-
forts of government. Unions may demand more
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generous redistributive programs in exchange
for wage moderation, and regularized partici-
pation by unions in the policy-making process
may heighten their influence. Here, too, there
is empirical support in the literature (Hicks,
1999:chap. 6; Hicks and Kenworthy, 1998;
Hicks and Swank, 1992; Swank and Martin,
2001), though it is difficult to disentangle the
impact of concertation from that of related fac-
tors such as social democratic government.
THE FUTURE OF NEOCORPORATISM
In the span of two decades, corporatism was
hailed as an effective model of governance in af-
fluent countries (Katzenstein, 1985; Schmitter,
1981), dismissed as irrelevant in an era of in-
ternationalization and restructuring (Ferner and
Hyman, 1998:xii), and rediscovered by policy
makers and scholars as a potentially superior
way of managing rapid economic and politi-
cal change (Auer, 2000; Hassel and Ebbinghaus,
2000; Pochet and Fajertag, 1997; Regini,
2000; Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). What lies
ahead?
The future of neocorporatism is bound up
with the ongoing transformation of social struc-
ture on the one hand and of the nation-state on
the other. Social groups in advanced societies,
certainly the producer groups of the industrial
age, have become less cohesive and more diffi-
cult to organize into centralized, monopolistic,
and hierarchical associations. For example, with
the decline ofFordist industrial organization and
Keynesian economic policy and the growing
prominence of the service sector, unionization
has fallen almost everywhere and the degree of
union centralization has declined in many coun-
tries (Traxler et aI., 2001; Western, 1997). Gen-
erally social structures today seem to generate
less stable group identities and give rise to more
individualistic perceptions of interest that may
make an encompassing association's "logic of
membership" intractable. Moreover, the pro-
ducer groups that formed the principal con-
stituency of postwar democratic corporatism are
shrinking in size while other groups with dis-
tinct political interests have emerged, such as
women or immigrants, who are not well rep-
resented within traditional corporatist arrange-
ments.
The nation-state, once the opponent and
later the sponsor of organized group interests, is
being transformed by economic and social inter-
nationalization. Exactly to what effect is, how-
ever, far from clear. Heightened capital mobility
has rendered firms less dependent on the domes-
tic institutions of anyone country, increased the
desire of employers for flexibility of labor and
labor costs, and impaired the capacity of govern-
ments to deliver on political deals. The break-
down of centralized wage bargaining in Sweden
in the early 198os, and the elimination of for-
mal interest-group representation on the boards
of several public agencies in the early 1990S,
are frequently cited as an example for the de-
cline oflabor-inclusive democratic corporatism
in its historical connection with Keynesianism
and the social democratic welfare state.
On the other hand, observers have expressed
skepticism about the degree to which globaliza-
tion is likely to alter national institutional struc-
tures and policy choices (Berger and Dore, 1996;
Garrett, 1998; Hollingsworth and Streeck, 1994;
Kitschelt et aI., 1999). Nonmarket institutions
can offer competitive advantages to firms that
may outweigh their costs. Quantitative analyses
by Traxler et al. (2001) suggest little if any con-
vergence in interest-group organization, wage-
setting arrangements, and interest-group partic-
ipation through the late 1990S. However, they
do find evidence of a trend toward "organized
decentralization" of wage bargaining, whereby
wages are set largely at the sectoral level but
coordinated informally across sectors (see also
Iversen, 1999; Thelen, 2001). Meanwhile, neo-
corporatist pacts dealing with issues such as wage
restraint and labor market and social security
reform have played a prominent role in the
Netherlands and Ireland - two countries widely
viewed as European economic success stories
over the past decade. Similar pacts have been
forged or renewed in Norway, Finland, Bel-
gium, and Italy (Auer, 2000; Hassel and Ebbing-
haus, 2000; Molina and Rhodes, 2002; Pochet
and Fajertag, 1997; Regini, 2000; Visser and
Hemerijck, 1997).





Generally, changes in the capacities of the
nation-state in the course of internationaliza-
tion seem to have different and partly contradic-
tory consequences for neocorporatism. Where
national states lose control to international mar-
kets, they become unable to underwrite tripar-
tite bargains, in which case a decline in state
capacities is associated with a decline in asso-
ciational capacities. At the same time, where
governments can no longer keep capital captive,
they may depend on organized groups to cre-
ate institutional conditions and infrastructures
attractive to investors. Also, states that come un-
der international pressure to balance their bud-
gets, like the member states of the European
Union, may need the cooperation of still pow-
erful trade unions for institutional reform and
wage restraint. In such instances, state weakness
may enhance rather than diminish the role and
power of associations.
On the other hand, most nation-states to-
day have embarked on a strategy of liberaliz-
ing their economies. Liberalization implies a
greater role for markets and regulatory author--
ities, at the expense of both discretionary state
intervention and corporatist bargaining. In part
liberalization responds to pressures exerted by
internationalization for increased competitive-
ness and openness of national economies; the
latter may require replacement of corporatist
self-government, for example of financial mar-
kets, with more transparent and internation-
ally accountable state regulation. There also,
however, may be domestic reasons for liberal-
ization, among them certain long-term effects
of neocorporatism after its peak twenty years
ago. These include overblown social security
systems, rigid labor markets, high and persis-
tent unemployment, a widening gap between
a shrinking group of well-represented insiders
and a growing group of disenfranchised out-
siders, and the defense by trade unions of a so-
cial policy and labor market regime that reflects
the social structures and economic conditions
of the 1970S rather than of the present. Es-
pecially in countries where trade unions and,
to an extent, employers use their institutional
position to veto change, governments have felt
challenged to limit the influence of corporatist
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interest groups and replace self-government
with more publicly accountable state control.
In this they have followed a spreading lib-
eral discourse that suspects any form of orga-
nized collectivism of particularistic rent-seeking
and places its hope on a strong state recreat-
ing free markets and defending them against in-
terference by "distributional coalitions" (Olson,
1982).
Although internationalization may make na-
tional states part with neocorporatism, it may
simultaneously open up new opportunities for
group self-government by "nongovernmental
organizations" in state-free international set-
tings. Prospects for a transnational renaissance
of prenational corporatism are, however, uncer-
tain. Group cohesion beyond the nation-state
tends to be weak. Also, the very absence of
state authority that might empower organized
groups deprives them of institutional support.
(In addition it makes it impossible to hold them
accountable to a public interest.) Internation-
ally there are only few organized groups ca-
pable of making binding rules for themselves,
not to mention correcting international market
outcomes by negotiated redistribution. Other
than competing states, the main actors in the
international arena are large firms, increasingly
transnational in character, with ample resources
to pursue their interests individually, uncon-
strained by union or government pressure forc-
ing them into international class solidarity, and
indeed with a growing capacity to extricate
themselves from associative governance at the
national level (Streeck, 1997).
Where there is something resembling neo-
corporatist interest intermediation above the
nation-state, it seems heavily dependent on the
sponsorship of international organizations like
the European Union. In its effort to develop
statelike properties, the European Union has
long cultivated a substructure of organized in-
terests from which it hopes to draw increased
legitimacy. But although the European Union
attracts a great deal of lobbying, this is far from
congealing in a corporatist system. Most of it
continues to be nationally based, as national in-
terest organizations hesitate to transfer authority
to their European peak associations. Although
making in pursuit of those interests. Yet the
long-term sustainability of such arrangements
is open to question. Regions, not being states,
are unable to insert coercive power in the vol-
untary relations between their citizens. In par-
ticular, they may lack the capacity to provide
the kind of support required to transform unsta-
ble, voluntaristic, pluralistic interest groups into
mature ones capable of attending to the larger
sectoral, regional, or national interest. For ex-
ample, regionally based unionism would have
to do without external sources of associational
monopoly, without authoritative stabilization of
bargaining arenas, and without recourse to a
public sphere balancing the manifold advantages
employers enjoy in the marketplace.
If the twentieth century that witnessed the
ascendancy of the modern nation-state was "still
the century of corporatism" (Schmitter, 1974),
the same may not be true for the postnational
twenty-first century.
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the European Commission relies and indeed
depends greatly on information and expertise
furnished by organized interests, devolution of
decision-making powers to organized interests is
rare. Nor has the "social dialogue" between the
Commission, the European trade union con-
federation, and European business developed
into tripartite concertation, mostly because na-
tional actors, including national governments,
jealously defend their autonomy. All in all, even
in the European Union international interest-
group politics is as a rule far more pluralist
than in national systems (Streeck and Schmit-
ter, 1991).
The same holds for corporatist arrangements
at the regional level within and, sometimes,
across national borders. Much of the literature
on "industrial districts" stresses the commonal-
ity of interests held by workers, employers and
policy makers in a number of subnational ar-
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